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Abstract  
If the central purpose of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) is to deliver improved reproductive 
autonomy - by facilitating enhanced choice between the continuation and termination of 
pregnancy - any public funded regime ought to be compatible with the legal grounds for 
decision-making in this context.  It is problematic for a State to facilitate access to information 
that would or is likely to result in legal dilemmas and conceptual issues for those using these 
tests.  Public funded testing should not be available for purposes that would be or are likely to be 
‘incompatible’ with any framework for lawful abortion.  In England and Wales, those 
incompatible purposes currently include the identification of: (1) gender in the absence of other 
genetic factors, and (2) specific abnormality that is unlikely to yield serious disability at birth. 
Consequently, expansion of the NIPT regime to include these purposes should entail changes in 
the abortion legal framework.  
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Introduction 
 
Perhaps it is easiest to start by telling you what this paper is not about.  It is not going to debate 
the ethical case for or against prenatal testing or diagnosis.  Nor does it seek to examine the 
general ethical case for or against public/ private funding of any particular type of screening 
regime. What this paper seeks to do is examine the backdrop to prenatal screening and non-
invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), and the particular purposes that a State might have in this 
context.  It goes on to argue that there is a close connection between these testing regimes and 
the legal/ regulatory framework for abortion.  As such, States ought to have regard to that 
connection when designing, facilitating and financing any prenatal testing regime.   
This paper takes as its fulcrum the UK RAPID evaluation study.  This study was created with 
input from the UK National Screening Committee (UK NSC) and funded by the National 
Institute for Health Research to evaluate the use of NIPT for Down’s syndrome.  NIPT is already 
available for this condition through the private sector in the UK
1
 and a decision will have to be 
made shortly by the UK NSC on whether these tests should be funded publicly through the NHS.  
It is argued that NIPT for Downs is compatible with the current legal regime in England and 
Wales providing it is kept within defined limits.  However, the conclusions caution against 
expansion of publicly funded NIPT without wider consideration and reform of the current 
abortion legal framework.
2
  This short paper is written in five parts.  Part 1 examines the UK 
model for prenatal screening and specifically non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) and NIPT.  
Part 2 goes onto consider the aims and purposes of these regimes.  Part 3 addresses why the 
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purposes and scope of any testing regime need to be consistent with the legal and regulatory 
framework for abortion. Part 4 considers what such a conclusion means in practice and, for 
simplicity, analysis is restricted to the legal and regulatory framework in England and Wales. 
This approach is taken because slightly different legal rules apply to abortion in other parts of the 
UK.
3
 And finally, part 5 concludes by looking at what this means for the future development and 
funding of pre natal testing in that jurisdiction.
4
   
 
1 The UK Model for Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing  
 
The UK already operates a fairly comprehensive prenatal screening programme.  This includes a 
combination of maternal blood tests, ultrasound scans and invasive diagnostic testing (notably 
Chorionic Villus Sampling (CVS) and Amniocentesis).  The discovery of cell-free fetal DNA 
(cffDNA) in maternal blood made it possible to undertake additional, and as we shall see, 
potentially more accurate and reliable tests that present minimal risk to mother and fetus.
5
  A 
distinction is made between the analysis of cell-free fetal DNA where the outcome can be 
diagnostic (NIPD)
6
 and where further tests are required to achieve this outcome (NIPT).
7
  
However, NIPT is proving to be very accurate in the context of Down’s syndrome and the 
detection of trisomy 21
8
.  Some studies have shown a detection rate for this trisomy in excess of 
99.5% and a false positive rate of 0.1%.
9
   Consequently, these tests are proving to be 
significantly more reliable than the current combined tests (maternal age, maternal serum 
biomarkers and ultrasound markers).
10
  NIPT also enables screening for other forms of 
aneuploidy (ie where there is an abnormal number of chromosomes) – specifically trisomy 13 
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(Patau’s syndrome) and 18 (Edward’s syndrome) - and can be undertaken earlier than 
conventional testing.  This test combination should hopefully limit the number of women having 
to undertake unnecessary invasive diagnostic tests and the consequential exposure to the 
increased risk of miscarriage (0.5-1%)
11
.  In the private sector, NIPT is available to parents to 
screen for trisomies 13, 18 and 21 but with the option to test for gender.
12
 
The RAPID study evaluated NIPT for Down’s syndrome for the UK NSC before adoption within 
the NHS
13
 and was led by Professor Lyn Chitty and her team at Great Ormond Street Hospital.  
The study offered NIPT for Downs as a contingent test – pregnant women underwent 
conventional combined screening, and, only if their risk was identified as greater than 1: 1000, 
were they offered NIPT prior to invasive testing.
14
  The study used UK based laboratories to 
undertake the DNA analysis whereas many of the private sector providers continue to utilise 
overseas analytical services.  The location of these services may be an important consideration 
because it might impact on the future access and security arrangements for this genetic data.  The 
RAPID study reported to UK NSC in May 2015 and endorsed the contingent use of NIPT within 
the NHS Down’s syndrome screening pathway.15  The UK NSC has still not made a final 
decision and evaluation of NIPT remains an ongoing project.
16
 
Whilst the UK appears to be moving to a restricted and contingent based model for NIPT, there 
is no single world view on that model.
17
  Some academics have predicted universal population 
testing in the future
18
 - there is already proof of concept for the analysis and mapping of the 
whole human genome.
19
  There is and will be the scope to test for non-health related factors and 
trivial information
20
 and the technical possibilities are only likely to increase over time.  
However, it remains to be seen whether parents will be able to understand and process a much 
wider (and possibly uncertain) range of data about the fetus and any future child it might become. 
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A distinction has sometimes been made between testing for specific diseases or rhesus status 
(conditions) and testing for fetal anomalies.
21
  The argument is that detection of the former can 
improve outcomes for the pregnancy/fetus; whereas detection of the latter only results in a choice 
between the continuation and termination of the pregnancy. However, it is possible that detection 
of anomalies could provide parents with the opportunity to prepare psychologically and 
physically for parenthood of a child with disability.  As De Jong & De Wert point out it may also 
be difficult to distinguish between these types of tests in practice
22
 as maternal blood may be 
subject to analysis for a number of distinct purposes (e.g. for the identification of Down’s 
syndrome and fetal sex). 
 
2 What is the aim and purpose of NIPT? 
 
The RAPID study situated general prenatal screening and diagnosis as: ‘a routine part of 
antenatal care’.23 A number of possible competing purposes have been highlighted for these 
tests depending on the information that is being looked for and the ‘end’ to which that 
information is to be put.  So prenatal screening could involve looking for the serious or trivial, 
for the health related or other information. In terms of ultimate ‘ends’, prenatal screening has 
tended to be categorised as either a process that improves public health or as one that facilitates/ 
enhances reproductive autonomy.  The question of ‘means’ and ‘ends’ are closely connected in 
this debate – for example, whether we are looking to act upon, ameliorate, cure or prevent a 
particular state of affairs.  We can see this in action in the context of rhesus status.  The rhesus 
status of a pregnant woman and her unborn baby are important because of the potential for 
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antibodies to cross the placenta and cause health problems for the developing child.
24
  So early 
rhesus testing can guide clinical treatment and help to improve pregnancy outcomes.  The 
difficulty comes when we look at screening for fetal abnormalities and non-health related factors. 
The stated aim of the RAPID evaluation study on Down’s syndrome was: 
‘to develop better and safer ways of detecting Down’s syndrome and some other chromosomal 
conditions in pregnancy.’25  
Clearly detection of these syndromes has a purpose. The NHS website emphasizes that Down’s 
screening is about enhancing and facilitating parental choice
26
 albeit with limited options: 
‘A small number of women who have a diagnostic test will find out their baby has Down's, 
Edwards' or Patau's syndrome. They then have two options.  
Some women decide to continue with the pregnancy and prepare for their child with the 
condition; others decide they do not want to continue with the pregnancy and have a termination 
(abortion).’27 
There appears to have been greater emphasis on the role of enhancing and/or enabling maternal 
and general parental autonomy in relation to anomaly screening.  In this context, De Jong and De 
Wert comment: 
‘The traditional aim of population screening (health gains won through timely treatment or 
prevention) does not readily apply to this type of prenatal screening…instead, prenatal 
screening for foetal abnormalities is generally understood as aiming at offering pregnant women 
(and their partners) options for reproductive choice.’28 
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The focus on autonomy is understandable particularly where there are no remedial or 
preventative options available to the parents and clinicians.  There is also a patent desire to avoid 
any discussion about eugenics and the explicit improvement of public health through the removal 
of unwanted disability.
29
  However there are also reasons why we may want to qualify the 
autonomy view of this form of prenatal testing.
30
  A State may have legitimate reasons not to 
support
31
 unfettered reproductive choice if it could send an explicit discriminatory message about 
disability.  Wilkinson argues there has to be limits placed on the role of autonomy because 
otherwise it would be untenable for the pro-choice camp to argue for any restrictions on testing.
32
  
Further, when it comes to the issue of public funding, unrestricted parental reproductive 
autonomy does not easily fit with the concept of distributive justice.
33
  Christian Munthe 
highlights the significant economic consequences that could flow from the public funding of 
open choice, and in particular, the expense of providing an adaptable test that meets patient 
wishes and at the same time ensures sufficient standards of counseling.
34
  
Public health considerations may also have an explicit role to play in the context of prenatal 
testing for fetal abnormality.
35
  Reliable non-invasive testing methods can reduce adverse 
pregnancy outcomes by limiting the number of unnecessary invasive tests and the accompanying 
risks and parental anxiety associated with these tests.  Advance knowledge may help prepare 
families psychologically and physically for the birth of a child with disability.
36
  The ability to 
identify disability or conditions accurately could have a role to play in public health planning and 
the distribution of future State resources.  The potential benefits of a publicly funded scheme 
might include central co-ordination and greater quality control over testing.  Specific public 
funding of NIPT would also remove the current inequity for those who cannot afford the expense 
of private testing.
37
  However, when it comes to trivial and/or non-medical reasons for NIPT, 
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there seems to be a much weaker public health rationale.
38
  Even if it can be argued that there is a 
moral right to access this type of information about a future child, it does not follow that the 
State should fund all stages of a process that would convert this into a meaningful legal right.
39
  
 
3 Why aims and purposes matter 
 
The central argument of this paper is that the purposes/aims of any prenatal testing regime need 
to be consistent with and correlate to the wider regulatory/legal framework in which that regime 
operates. A State should act coherently and consistently in the promotion of health and 
reproductive autonomy. Inconsistency would send confusing messages to the public and prenatal 
testing arrangements need to operate within the formal legal frameworks that have been agreed 
upon and not simply constructed by the Executive as they see fit. If reproductive freedom is the 
central aim of a publicly funded NIPT regime for fetal abnormality, the State has to be clear and 
transparent about how these ends are to be realized.  If the only plausible way to exercise choice 
in the event of detection is to terminate or continue the pregnancy, that needs to be made clear 
and a State can only plausibly facilitate reproductive choice if there are lawful options for the 
parents.  To be even more explicit, there ought to be consistency between the choice presented or 
highlighted by NIPT and the legal/ regulatory framework in which reproductive choices and 
related clinical decisions are made.
40
  Further, public funding of information should not facilitate 
or encourage, either directly or indirectly, choices that are inconsistent with other public goals, 
policies and laws.
41
  Wilkinson argues that supporters of prenatal screening must apply their 
view consistently: 
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‘If we are talking about state funding and support then consistency requires proponents of the 
Pure Choice view to go further and to advocate not merely the legal permissibility of sex-
selective abortion, but the state funding of this as well’.42  
It also means that pro-choice supporters need to align any publicly funded NIPT regime with the 
legal framework for abortion in that jurisdiction.  If the law restricts (as it does) certain types of 
abortion and reproductive choice,
43
 consistency demands that there should be some limitation on 
publicly funded prenatal screening where the stated purpose is enabling/ enhancing particular 
reproductive choices.  Of course, this argument rests on a stark presentation of choice,
44
 and as 
discussed, the provision of information about anomaly or disability may very well provide 
parents with an opportunity to prepare for their future child and for any diagnosed conditions 
upon birth.
45
  It also assumes that a choice exists at all – for some, the legal option to terminate 
may not provide an acceptable moral option because of their own personal values and beliefs.  
Despite these qualifications, it seems to me that there still ought to be some degree of 
convergence between the two frameworks if reproductive choice is the central public rationale 
for NIPT.  There may be those that argue that the State should facilitate and fund reproductive 
freedom in relation to lawful options (eg to terminate) available in other jurisdictions.
46
  Again 
there appears to be the risk of incoherent public narratives and State complicity in what would 
otherwise be an unlawful procedure in the home jurisdiction. 
It has already been argued that the aim of reproductive choice may have to be qualified and there 
may be plausible public health aims for NIPT.  However, the aim of improving public health sits 
uncomfortably alongside non-health related testing and a legal abortion framework that explicitly 
works on a medical model.  It has been argued that the reality of the Abortion Act 1967 is that 
abortions are available on demand, at least until the 24
th
 week of pregnancy.
47
 This is because 
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Section 1(1) (a) of that Act includes a social ground for abortion that concentrates on the 
comparative risk to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children 
of her family.  However, whilst the legal provisions explicitly adopt a medical model for 
abortion, public perception must surely play a role.  Again, is there not is a risk that State funded 
testing for trivial and non health related information could confuse public understanding and 
damage respect for the law?  To be explicit, it might send mixed messages if a State were to fund 
testing with the purpose of facilitating a choice that it otherwise restricts through other legal 
means (eg facilitating a choice to terminate a pregnancy for trivial or non-health related reasons).  
A State should not seek normalize choices that it is does not legislate for and a better solution 
seems to be to work towards some convergence in the two frameworks.  In practical terms, that 
may only be realized through amended or new legislation.  Further, even if a State provides 
lawful options to terminate pregnancy, it does not follow that those options should be 
encouraged via prenatal testing or otherwise through unlimited public funding.
48
  Once again we 
come back to the need for clear public messages and understanding about the central purposes of 
any testing regime.   
Finally we come to the argument that parents should have the right to know.
49
  Even if there 
should be an unfettered parental right to access full genetic information about their future child, 
it does not automatically follow that the State has an obligation to fund that right. If the purpose 
of testing is to enable access to information in furtherance of such a right, and not to facilitate 
choice, why should the State fund that provision without clear evidence of public benefit?  The 
evidence of public benefit in relation to non-health related information appears to be weak and 
far from compelling. 
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4 The practical impact in England & Wales
50
   
 
The Abortion Act 1967 (AA 1967) does not explicitly acknowledge or provide a parental/ 
maternal right to terminate a pregnancy – there remains medical control over the decision even if 
the public perception is of abortion on demand.
51
  So the starting point is that the law does not 
provide unfettered parental choice to terminate a pregnancy in England & Wales.  In the context 
of NIPT, the most relevant legal provisions are sections 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(d) of the Abortion Act.   
The former section
52
 provides the following lawful ground for termination: 
‘That the pregnancy has not exceeded its 24th week and that the continuance of the pregnancy 
would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or 
mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family’. 
It has been argued that this provides the lawful basis for termination for inconvenience or sex 
selection on the basis that the continuation of the pregnancy always presents a greater risk than 
termination.
53
  However, that view seems flawed – there may be circumstances where a 
termination could present a greater risk than continuing the pregnancy,
54
 and in any event, the 
professional regulators and the Department of Health (DOH) stipulate individual medical 
assessment in every case.
55
  Further, the DOH has made it abundantly clear that termination on 
the sole grounds of gender is unlawful: 
‘Abortion on the grounds of gender alone is illegal. Gender is not itself a lawful ground under 
the Abortion Act (see Annex A for the lawful grounds under Section 1(1)). However, it is lawful 
to abort a fetus where two RMPs
56
 are of the opinion, formed in good faith, “that there is a 
substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental 
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abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped”, and some serious conditions are known to be 
gender-related.’57 
That takes us neatly onto the lawful ground in section 1(1)(d): 
‘that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such physical or 
mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped’.58 
Now this provision has considerable scope for uncertainty both in terms of assessing the 
likelihood of risk and establishing its core purpose.
59
  Indeed, Sheelagh McGuiness has 
suggested that in practice this section may be ‘operating beyond any plausible legitimate 
interpretation of the ground’.60  She also highlights the presumptive effect that this section could 
have on parental choices following prenatal screening and this is important if the options 
presented are not lawful ones.
61
  ‘Substantial risk’ is not defined in this section - plainly it does 
not require a certainty but the degree of probability required is not clear.  The phrase ‘would 
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities’ is essentially a medical question.  Down’s 
syndrome appears to fit this test but what about a HIV positive fetus that may be asymptomatic 
at birth?
62
  Andrew Grubb concludes that HIV infection could be construed as a physical 
abnormality under this subsection
63
 but questions whether any future child with that condition 
would suffer from abnormalities so ‘as to be seriously handicapped’.  The section links 
abnormality with a certain (serious) degree of handicap/ disability.  Down’s syndrome may fit 
this requirement but there must be uncertainty whether the subsection applies to a fetus that only 
has a high likelihood of the future risk of handicap (eg Huntington’s Chorea) or where there is 
only a possible future risk of handicap (as in the HIV example).
64
   
 
13 
 
Let us put to one side the lengthy discussion we could have about the nature and assessment of 
disability.
65
  What is reasonably clear is that the regulatory framework in England and Wales 
does not explicitly authorise the termination of pregnancy where gender or trivial non-medical 
reasons are the sole criterion for decision-making.  There may be some equivocation because of 
the effects of section 1(1)(a) but again there is no explicit State endorsement of terminations 
based solely on minor abnormality or possible future disability.  Whilst these legal restrictions 
remain in place it would be illogical and inconsistent for the State to fund a system of explicit 
prenatal testing for gender, minor abnormality or uncertain/future disability.  Nor is it clear that 
an advance system of legal assurances from pregnant women ‘that they will not seek to use the 
information gained from the test for terminating pregnancy on the grounds of fetal sex’66 would 
obviate that concern and indeed, may prove unworkable and unenforceable in practice in any 
event. 
 
The RAPID evaluation study on Downs appears to align NIPT with the current regulatory 
framework for abortion and so the difficulty will only arise if we look to expand the categories 
for genetic analysis. As De Jong et al. have noted: 
 
‘there is a  tendency to widen the scope of testing in the context of prenatal screening for foetal 
abnormalities….As soon as NIPT can be affordably and reliably used for screening beyond the 
major trisomies, a further widening can be expected’.67 
Of course, there could be other reasons to resist expansion of any testing regime both in terms of 
scope and category of condition.  For example, there would need to be careful consideration as to 
whether expansion would increase the availability of uncertain information and unnecessarily 
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complicate counseling and decision-making in this context.
68
  Thought would also have to be 
given as to the possible rights of the future child and whether it ought to encompass a right ‘not 
to know’ about genetic data obtained from such testing.69 
Finally and for completeness, I should also mention the legal framework governing the use of 
pre-implantation genetic screening (PGS) and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).  In 
summary, PGS is pre-implantation embryo testing for aneuploidies and PGD is pre-implantation 
embryo screening for specific gene mutations and diseases.  The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990
70
 makes it permissible (subject to licence) to test the ex vivo embryo for 
certain abnormalities that might affect its capacity to result in a live birth and to avoid serious 
medical conditions.
71
  Importantly, the legal framework does not explicitly permit embryo 
testing/selection on the basis of gender alone – instead the emphasis is on avoiding the risk of a 
genetic condition related to sex.
72
  In any event, the choice is technically different to that 
presented to parents post NIPT - with PGS/PGD the option is whether to implant the embryo or 
not.   
 
5 Conclusions  
 
Although NIPT appears to bring many benefits, there does need to be clear and consistent public 
narrative in relation to the promotion and facilitation of parental choice in relation to any testing 
regime.  If the facilitation of parental choice is a core purpose of testing, States should make that 
explicit and exercise caution before expanding the public funding and provision of NIPT without 
wider consideration of the connected regulatory frameworks.   Indeed, this paper goes further 
15 
 
and argues that publicly funded provision of NIPT ought not to be made available for any 
purposes that would be or are likely to be incompatible with any framework for lawful abortion.  
In England and Wales, those ‘incompatible purposes’ currently include the primary identification 
of (1) gender in the absence of related genetic factors and (2) specific abnormalities that are 
unlikely to result in serious disability at birth.
73
  Of course, Parliament is at liberty to change the 
abortion framework and expand NIPT but it is important that changes are not made in isolation.  
Further, if enhancement of parental choice is a core aim of screening, Parliament should also be 
explicit about the priority of and mechanism for ensuring choice in the abortion framework. 
That still leaves two issues for consideration.   First, what should a State do about the incidental 
availability of genetic data following the collection of blood samples in the public health 
system?
74
  Even if testing is carried out for a specific funded purpose, the blood samples may be 
capable of yielding other genetic data (including trivial information) outside that purpose.  
Maternal access to incidental blood data probably cannot be resisted on legal grounds unless 
there are strong therapeutic reasons for withholding that information.   However, there appear to 
be stronger arguments for not facilitating analysis of incidental data via additional public 
funding.
75
  Certainly the public facilitation of such analysis (before and after birth) merits further 
consideration.   
Secondly, even if public funding is limited to contingent and restricted options,
76
 consideration 
ought to be given to the potential impact on abortion services.  So for example, will NIPT have 
any material effect on the demand for abortions and the balance between private and public 
sector abortion provision?  How might the availability of new or different data impact on the 
complexity of parental decision-making during the pregnancy?   It does automatically follow that 
the provision of more information to parents will necessarily result in better choices and 
16 
 
pregnancy outcomes. Careful consideration will need to be given as to how parents are supported 
and whether the State should be funding arrangements for this process. 
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